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Large geographic disparities in E/Pop,
related to size, manufacturing, and…

Why not move people to jobs? (1) People don’t want to move;
(2) Out-migration destroys jobs, so E/Pop is unchanged.
Elasticity of local jobs to population shock
Muth (1971)

0.92

Greenwood/Hunt (1984)

1.18

Amior/Manning (2018)

0.79

Beaudry/Green/Sand (2018)

0.99

Howard (2018)

1.07
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Our main jobs-to-people strategy is
state/local business incentives
• Incentives tripled 1990-2015, to $50 billion/year.
• Foxconn & some Amazon offers 10x avg incentive/job
• Incentives not targeted on distressed areas.
• Targeted on tradable industries, but little correlation with industry
R&D or wages.
• Favor large firms: firms > 100 employees get 90%, compared to
their 66% employment share.
• Many incentives long-term, > 10 years.
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Market-failure rationale for subsidizing jobs in distressed
places: asymmetric benefits due to social costs of involuntary
unemployment

• Bartik (2009, 2015) finds MSAs w/ higher nonemployment have 2/3rds higher E/Pop effects. But only
marginally statistically significant.
• Austin/Glaeser/Summers (2018) find that “consistent
PUMAs” with lower prime-age male E/Pop have 3/5ths
higher E/Pop effects. But both geographic unit & distress
indicator are problematic.
• Should geo area be smaller than CZ? Spatial mismatch,
recent evidence from Manning/Petrongolo (2017).
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Demand shocks to CZs dominate county shocks, due to both
multiplier & labor market spillovers
Effects of shocks to county/CZ log(emp) on year-to-year change in county log(emp/pop)
County effects
CZ effects

OLS

2SLS (share IVs)

0.215

0.195

(0.035)

(0.153)

0.117

0.340

(0.048)

(0.165)

Reduced form

0.122
(0.077)
0.497
(0.105)

1st-stage share effects on change in Iog(emp) of:

County share effect
CZ share effect

County
0.543
(0.066)
0.622
(0.094)

CZ
0.046
(0.025)
1.103
(0.076)

609 counties >65K pop (77% of U.S.) in 225 CZs; 2005-06 to 2015-16.
Year dummies included; clustered at CZ. Data: ACS; BEA; WholeData.
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CZ demand shock effects vary more significantly with
overall (E/Pop) than with sub-group E/Pop
Demand shock effects on annual change in log of CZ overall (E/P), interacted with lagged (E/P) for
different groups
Lagged (E/P) interaction is for group on right
Share effect (defined as shock to log E)
Share effect*lagged log(E/P)
Elasticity at 10th percentile of (E/P)
Elasticity at 90th percentile of E/P
10th percentile
90th percentile
Ratio of effects

All 16+
0.152
(0.145)

-0.918
(0.211)
0.767
(0.107)
0.548
(0.094)
0.512
0.649
1.40

Prime-age
0.332
(0.128)

Non-college 25+
0.285
(0.143)

-1.112

-0.804

(0.314)
0.716
(0.096)
0.539
(0.098)
0.708
0.831
1.33

(0.240)
0.727
(0.094)
0.570
(0.100)
0.578
0.702
1.28

Estimates for 240 CZs>200K pop (89% of U.S.), 2005-06 to 2015-16. Year dummies included, clustered at CZ.
All 3 regressions used same dependent variable: change in OVERALL log(E/Pop).
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D-shock effects vary non-linearly with
distress, vary more for LFP, by >4 to 1.
Effect of log(demand shock) on change in log(3 diff labor force outcomes),
2 CZ groupings; 120 CZs in each grouping.

Lower E/Pop half of CZs (27% of total pop; cutoff 1 pp below nat avg; avg
E/Pop is 54.8%)

Dep var: change in (logged)

E/Pop

E/LabF LabF/Pop

0.794

0.318

(0.118)

(0.055)

0.476
(0.098)

Upper half of CZs (avg. E/Pop is 62.5%)

T-stat on difference

0.396

0.284

(0.132)
2.25

(0.080)
0.35

0.113
(0.082)
2.85

3 dep var by 2 groups = 6 regressions. Includes year dummies, clustered at CZ. 240
CZs comprise 89% of U.S. population.
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Do local Ld shocks have lasting labor
market benefits? Yes, due to skills effects.
LR elasticity of (E/Pop) wrt local jobs
BARTIK (1991), 8 YRS
BLANCHARD/KATZ (1992), 17 YEARS

0.23
0

BARTIK (1993), 17 YRS

0.25

BOUND/HOLZER (2000), 10 YRS

0.18

PARTRIDGE/RICKMAN (2006), 10 YRS

0.21

NOTOWIDIGDO (2013), 10 YRS

0.14

BEAUDRY/GREEN/SAND (2014), 10 YRS

0.24

BARTIK (2015), 10 YRS

0.34

AMIOR/MANNING (2018), 10 YRS
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Other studies:

Freedman (2017) “Mississippi's 1936 BAWI program increased county LFP for >24 yrs.”
Hershbein/Stuart (forthcoming) “MSAs with worse recessions have lower E/Pop a decade later”
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Are there MARGINAL agglomeration economies to
adding jobs to local clusters, & do they VARY by place?
• Agglomeration exists, but are there benefits of adding still
more tech jobs to Silicon Valley?
• Might justifying targeting tech in tech clusters; might be
way for distressed places to lower cost per job created.
• Agglomeration used to justify higher multipliers (REMI).
• Moretti (2010) estimated high-tech multiplier of 6, which
would justify very large incentives.
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LR high-tech multiplier varies
w/ high-tech share, E/Pop, & CZ size
Interaction of LR High-tech and Low-tech Multipliers with Local Employment Size, Prime-Age
Employment Rate, and Initial High-tech Share

Mult at means

Interaction w/
log(emp98)

Interaction with
log(prime-age
E/Pop)

High-tech

1.428

0.371

-9.169

Low-tech

(0.327)
1.219
(0.138)

(0.180)
-0.004
(0.057)

(4.531)
-0.111
(1.012)

0.379

-0.586

Standard dev of interaction term times
high-tech coefficient

Interaction w/
log(High-tech
share 98)

1.963
(0.449)
-0.532
(0.155)

0.762

284 CZs w/ 1998 employment>50K (93% of U.S.), 1998-99 to 2015-16. Multiplier is cumulative effect of share effect demand shock
w/ 5 lags. 979 industries used. High-tech are 14% of total jobs, & have industry employment in science/engineering/technician
occupations that is 2x national avg. Year dummies included, & standard errors clustered by CZ. Dependent variable is year-to-year change
in log(CZ employment).
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High-tech multiplier: threshold effects in
high-tech share, 20 groups of CZs
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Services to provide business inputs can sometimes be more costeffective than incentives (for sources, see Bartik CBPP report)
Annual costs per job-year created (uses 3% discount rate)
Average business tax incentives, Bartik (2018)

$16,600

High-tech business tax incentives in high-tech
areas, Bartik/Sotherland (2019)
Customized job training,
Holzer/Block/Cheatham/Knott (1993)

$10,000
$3,000

Manufacturing extension, Jarmin(1998, 1999)

$2,700

Empowerment zones (block grant + hiring
credits), Busso/Gregory/Kline (2013)

$1,300

Brownfield redevelopment, Paull (2008)

$1,000

TVA (Infrastructure?), Kline/Moretti (2014)

$800
$-

$2,000

$4,000

$6,000

$8,000 $10,000 $12,000 $14,000 $16,000 $18,000
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Principles for how states should reform
incentives
• Choose incentive levels based on state’s distress levels, and
target distressed areas within states.
• Target high-tech firms in high-tech areas.
• Reduce long-term incentives.
• Don’t favor larger firms.
• Rely more on services enhancing business inputs (including
business services, infrastructure, skills).
• Evaluate (RDD, surveys, simulation models).
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VA’s HQ2 deal was $20K per job in cash (nat
avg is $50K), more $ for skills, infrastructure

High job growth cities with high employment
rates should cut back incentives.
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Should feds intervene?
• No efficiency problem if states/locals optimally price job creation.
• Distributional problems even with optimal Tiebout competition:
distressed areas pay, capital owners gain (Slattery, 2019).
• Political problems: state/local political leaders gain politically by
long-term cash incentives to largest firms.
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A proposal for federal block grant
assistance for distressed communities
• Federal block grant for distressed communities recognizes
diverse needs & ideas, & potential synergies.
• Tie block grant to reducing excessive long-term incentives for
1,500 firms w/ >10K employees.
• Evaluate block grant via RDD.
• Program size: $18-$36 billion per year for 10 to 20 years is a
realistic magnitude to help distressed areas’ job needs.
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What will promote needed reforms?
• Transparency
• Evaluation
• Well-developed alternatives to cash incentives
• Full-employment macro environment
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